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Abstract— The detection of covert channels has quickly

become a vital need due to their pervasive nature and the
increasing popularity of the Internet. In recent years, new
and innovative methods have been proposed to aid in the
detection of covert channels. Existing detection schemes are
often too specific and are ineffective against new covert
channels. In this paper, we expound upon previous work
done with timing channels and apply it to detecting covert
storage channels. Our approach is based on the assumption
that the entropy of covert channels will vary from that of
previously observed, legitimate, communications. This
change in the entropy of a process provides us with a
method for identifying storage channels. Using this
assumption we created proof of concept code capable of
detecting various covert storage channels. The results of
our experiments demonstrate that we can successfully detect
existing and unpublished covert storage channels
accurately.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since Lampson [1] originally introduced the idea of covert
channels on trusted systems, network based approaches have
become more prevalent [2]. These network based approaches
make it extremely challenging to secure traditional networks.
Covert channels also prove problematic for individuals,
companies, and countries in securing their information or
data. In general there have been a number of different
approaches, each with varying levels of success for detecting
and dealing with network covert channels [2]. Most of these
proposed schemes are designed to detect a specific covert
channel and rely solely on signatures.
Recently, there has been research into using statistical
methods in order to better detect covert channels, with mixed
results [31]. Typically the major hindrance of these
experiments is due to the large number of possibilities at
different levels of network communications where a covert
channel might occur. While there is recent research into a
general detection scheme for network based timing channels
[3], the same type of general solution has not been
implemented for storage channels.

In this paper we propose an entropy based detection
mechanism for storage based network covert channels.
Entropy, as defined by Shannon, is a measure of the
uncertainty associated with a random variable [4]. While we
observe that a network has many different types of data, we
postulate that much of it remains constant with the exception
of application payloads and checksum fields. From this we
concluded that the creation of a storage channel should
behave as a statistical outlier when compared to the normal
operation of a network.
In order to detect this we use a large baseline estimate of
the network traffic and analyze new entries into the network
based on the calculated entropy levels that have been seen.
The effect of a given packet will then modify the previous
entropy estimation allowing, in time, the system to learn what
is acceptable for the network and adapt to new technologies,
as well as the detection of storage channels.

2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Covert channels have historically been broken up into two
separate categories: storage channels and timing channels [7].
More recently a non-ambiguous definition has been devised
that defines a storage covert channel as a communication
channel in which “the output alphabet consists of different
responses all taking the same time to be transmitted” and a
timing covert channel as a channel where “the output
alphabet is made up of different time values corresponding to
the same response” [10, 12]. Additionally, the idea of
behavioral based covert channels has been introduced in [11].
These categories are further broken down by the system they
use (network or single system), their stealthiness, and
bandwidth. The main characteristic of a covert channel is the
aim to hide the fact that a transmission is taking place [5].
Early research has shown it is almost impossible to
completely eliminate covert channels. Accordingly, the US
government has stated that a covert channel with a bandwidth
under 1 bit per second is acceptable [7]. Thus the main goal
of research in this field is to develop defenses against covert
channels such as removing them, disrupting them, managing
their threat and alerting to their presence. Since there is
always such a large amount of data, the techniques of
alerting, managing and disrupting are more realistic and
prevalent in research [2].

There has been extensive research devoted to detecting
timing channels. Research started with [6] and the
identification of covert channel capacity for auditability.
Additional auditability techniques were introduced in [15]
which allowed for audited applications that depended on
relative timing of operations. The first techniques to prevent
timing channels were presented in [9, 14] in the forms of
pumping and artificial noise injection, these techniques
introduce artificial timing delays to communications in order
to eliminate timing channels. In [8] the idea of pumping is
evolved into that of jammers which can modulate noise and
timing in order to reduce the overall capacity of a given
channel. Recent research has established a basis for
statistically determining a timing channel from amongst
legitimate data and alerting on it [3, 5]. Throughout this
whole time frame, individuals who developed covert
channels also presented signature based defenses for
detecting their own specific covert channels [10, 22, 25].
While many effective techniques have been developed to
defend against timing based channels less published work is
available to detect covert storage channels. We see early
work done on calculating bandwidth and capacity of the
channels by [17]. Additionally, [11, 16] discuss the
possibility of detecting storage channels at the development
stage of production. Recently, [17, 19] used network
normalization to remove avenues that could potentially carry
a covert channel. As with timing channels, individuals
authors also presented signature based methods to detect their
own storage channel [20, 21, 23, 24]. In our paper we
expound upon previous detection techniques available for
timing channels [3], applying them to storage channels to
provide a viable solution to detect network based storage
channels.

3. ENTROPY CALCULATION
3.1 Entropy
Our hypothesis for detection of storage based covert
channels focuses on the mathematical formula known as
information entropy. As previously stated, entropy is a
measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable.
Putting this simply, entropy tells us how much randomness
exists in a set of values for a given variable. In this case, the
random variable is a field in a network protocol header. By
this logic, we are able to gather the values for fields and, after
collecting a minimum amount, calculate the randomness of
the field value. At some point this randomness value should
reach a plateau, if the field itself isn’t based on a random
function. At this point we assume that this is the normal
entropy for that field on the network, and that a significant
change in entropy would be a sign of the existence of a covert
storage channel. As a quick example, the RFC for ICMP
denotes that the code field for an ICMP Echo Request should
always be zero. If we assume that all devices on the network
are obeying the RFC we should be able to say with certainly
that the randomness of this field, over time, should equal
zero. The presence of a covert storage channel utilizing the

code field would thus create a spike in entropy, triggering an
alert.

4. TEST CHANNELS
We selected a number of covert storage channels in order
to test how effective our algorithm was at detecting variations
on a network. We developed or implemented the following
covert channels which had varying levels of bandwidth and
stealthiness along with network impact. Each test channel
was chosen because it uses a different network protocol,
giving us a wider array of covert channels to test.

4.1 ICMPv4 & ICMPv6 Based Covert
Channels
In order to first identify a basic covert channel we
developed a very simple technique to send data via the ICMP
code field. According to the RFC this field should always be
zero [29]. This technique was based loosely on the ideas
presented in [26] and enabled us to have a moderately
stealthy channel from which to develop our test methods
around. This concept was then expanded, to include both the
identification and sequence numbers in the ICMP Echo
header.
To add another protocol to our tests, we created a ICMPv6
covert channel based loosely on [27, 20]. This allowed us to
expand our abilities to detect different protocols beyond those
based on IPv4. This covert channel uses techniques similar
to that of the ICMPv4 variant discussed earlier..

4.2 UDP Based Covert Channel
After demonstrating success with an ICMP covert channel,
we examined a storage based covert channel presented in
[28]. This covert channel modulates the length fields found in
network and transport layer protocols to send packets with
even or odd lengths, which in turn translate to a one or zero.
This gives the potential to transmit a bit of data per packet.
Using standardized protocols such as UDP and IP this model
proposes a minimum bandwidth ratio of 1:11680, but can
easily be increased depending on the maximum transmission
unit for a network.

4.3 TCP Based Covert Channel
Our last test channel was a very simple covert channel
found in the TCP protocol. This channel is one of the classic
examples of a storage based covert channel and is presented
in [14]. This covert channel uses an unused field in the TCP
header to send up to 4 bits of data per packet. It should be
noted that this is a dated and deprecated covert channel.

5. EXPERIMENTATION
To reinforce our hypothesis that storage channels can be
detected using entropy, we developed a proof of concept
(PoC) program capable of capturing, dissecting and

calculating entropy associated with network traffic. This
program uses the network protocol dissectors built into
Scapy, a packet manipulation module for Python. After
creating our proof of concept code and the test channels
described above, we conducted a few experiments to test the
overall effectiveness of the code. Our experiment consisted
of using random packet captures from an active private
network; each packet capture was 50,000 packets in size and
was captured at different points during the day. In each
packet capture one of the covert channels that we
implemented was executed. We parsed these packets into our
software and evaluated our success based on the outcome.

5.1 Proof of Concept Design
The overall flow of the PoC is summarized in the figure
below [Figure 1]. The program has two phases: a learning
phase, and a analysis phase. Even though the program is
designed to be a proof of concept, it is still designed to be
robust and expandable. This would allow us to move from
just a proof of concept to a usable, implementable piece of
code.
Figure1PoCFlow

5.1.1 Learning Phase
In the learning phase, the program establishes a network
entropy profile by capturing and storing network traffic. The
PoC allows a customizable window size of traffic to be
specified. This is designed to provide flexibility for various
network implementations. The window size is a requirement
of the program that specifies how much traffic will be taken
in before the actual entropy comparisons are calculated. This
is done to establish a base entropy calculation for the
network. By definition the larger the window size the more
accurate comparisons will be, leading to less false positives.
The window size also serves as the buffer for incoming
packets during the analysis phase, therefore, a larger window
size, although allowing for more comparisons, also requires
exponentially more computation. Another feature we have
added during this phase is the ability to manually specify
which protocols should be analyzed, thereby decreasing the

amount of computation required. Once the specified
threshold of network traffic has been reached, the program
transitions to the analysis phase.

5.1.2 Analysis Phase
The analysis phase is responsible for monitoring and
alerting deviations in entropy based on the profile established
in the learning phase, as well as to continuously learn and
maintain the entropy profile. This process creates a network
dependent behavioral based approach to detecting storage
based covert channels. We provided a configurable
sensitivity level which allows the code to be customizable to
a given network. The various setting of the sensitivity
parameter control, to some degree, the amount of false
positives produced by the code. The sensitivity parameter
works hand in hand with the window size parameter specified
in the previous section to create a scalable sensitivity that
allows the window size to range from a value as small as 64
packets to as large as 500,000 packets and remain accurate.

5.2 Experimental Setup
We had a total of four experiments that we conducted in
which we attempted to detect our test covert channels.
Although each tests was performed independently the same
application and principles were used for each. For all four of
our experiments we used the same default settings. For our
experiments we choose the relatively low training window
size of 256, that is, the program took its base assessment of
the network from the first 256 packets and started evaluating
entropy after that point. While with a higher window size we
would see initially lower false positive results the total
detection rate should arrive at the same level of effectiveness
do to its ability to learn the network. The reason why we
selected a low window size is so that we didn’t discard vital
packet information where our covert channels might be
occurring in the experiment data. In real world usage training
could be done on many thousands of packets prior to full
scale usage. The experiments were all designed to transmit
the same message for each channel to maintain consistency
for detection purposes. We choose the words “this is a test
hello world”. Additionally, for each experiment we used 3
different levels of sensitivity, what these levels indicate is
the amount of variation in entropy on a given field that was
allowed without reporting the event as suspicious. The three
levels: low, medium and high had 10.04%, 8.007%, and
3.45% variation allowed respectively.

5.3 Experimental Results
Our experiments indicated that our original notion that
covert channels will behave as statistical entropy outliers was
correct. With high sensitivity we achieved, on average, a
94.75% detection rate with a false positive rate less than 1%.
While that is an accomplishment, having several hundred
false positives could present an issue without proper
screening. Low sensitivity achieved nearly as impressive
detection rates with an average of 75.25% of covert packets

detected with a far lower false positive rate of 124.75 or
0.25%. Ultimately, we believe that the experimental results
show that given proper training and configuration our method
would result in lower false positive rates while maintaining
the expected high detection rates. It is also important to note
that false positives that were detected are activity that is not
normally seen on the network. That being the case, although
it is not a covert channel, the packet has a high probability of
being other unwanted traffic. Additionally, although we can
see detection rates drop off at low sensitivity in a monitored
environment, only one detection of a covert channel should
be enough to alert the maintainer of the network to its
presence and allow for it to be disabled accordingly.
Figure 2 – Detection Rates

level of false positives getting 367 false positives on high
sensitivity, 197 false positives on medium sensitivity, and
103 false positives on low sensitivity.

5.3.3 ICMPv6 Code Channel Results
Being very similar to the original ICMP channel we
expected similar results in terms of detection rates and false
positives. We were indeed not disappointed, the variation that
we had is most likely a result of the different traffic between
the two captures. Our results had 392, 278, and 114 false
positives on high, medium, and low sensitivity levels
respectively. We achieved slightly better detection rates
compared to the regular ICMP channel as well - detecting
72% on low sensitivity, 87% on medium sensitivity, and 95%
on high sensitivity. A reason for these slightly better rates
could be due to the fact that although the network captures
contain IPv6 traffic it is relatively low due to the amount of
IPv4 packet. This discrepancy, although true in real life, also
makes it harder for our covert channel to blend in thereby
making it easier to detect.

5.3.4 UDP Length Channel Results

5.3.1 ICMP Code Field Results
When testing for the ICMP Code channel we originally
used high sensitivity, although this approach generated many
more false positives, 408 precisely, it alerted us to 97% of the
packets that contained the covert channel. When we moved to
medium sensitivity where an 8.007% change in entropy per
second would alert us, we received similarly high results,
achieving an 84% detection rate with 263 false positives.
Moving to low sensitivity we only achieved a 68% detection
rate but we also only had 126 false detections over our entire
capture of 50,000 packets.

Our final channel dealt with UDP length and had very
interesting properties where it didn’t try to modify an actual
field but rather modified the packet itself in order to add
length. While we expected to be able to detect this channel
we expected the results to be lower detection rates then the
other channels. We had very similar false positives to the
other channels having 433, 329, 156 false positives with
regards to high, medium and low sensitivity respectively. The
detection rates, while existent, were lower here being 87, 72,
and 67 percent

Figure 3 – False Positives Rates

5.3.2 TCP Unused Field Channel Results
The TCP unused field channel can only transmit 4 bits per
packet, as a result very many packet have to be sent in order
to get a full message across. This turned out to be a double
edged sword in terms of detection for our algorithm. In the
short term such a large amount of random traffic was
immediately detected on all sensitivity settings. However, we
found that if the message was very large the extreme amount
of traffic would eventually become expected by the algorithm
causing detection rate to drop. Using our test message this
channel generated 26 packets, on both high and medium we
had a 100% detection rate for this particular channel. When
on low sensitivity we dropped to 94%. While the detection
rate was high we continued to maintain a comparative steady

6. LIMITATIONS
In this section we discuss possible limitations of our
entropy based system to detect covert channels. A large
requirement imposed by this system is the need for intense
packet analysis. This scanning can be done on existing packet
captures but is most effective on a live network. This type of

packet analysis is most analogous to deep packet inspection
and requires an in-line component that will slow down the
network.
Additionally, at this time, our approach is only possible on
protocols for which the specification is known and using
unencrypted transmissions. The reason for this is due to the
entropy calculation on a per field basis. As a result of the
requirements there are several countermeasures to this type of
detection, the most obvious being encryption. Other
countermeasures include: using unknown protocols and using
non-network based covert channels. As with most entropy
based systems adjusting the system correctly to minimize
false positives, while still reporting legitimate covert channels
is pivotal.
As a final limitation, our tool is still not one-hundred
percent error free. Because of its fully adaptive capabilities,
our proof of concept is prone to false-positive results,
especially in high entropy fields. This means that the tool,
while effective, might require additional human examination
of network traffic.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We expounded on previous work for using entropy to
detect timing channels and applied it successfully to the
detection of storage based covert channels. We designed and
created a system which is implemented for some of the more
prevalent packet types and allows easy expansion in the
future for other types. We utilized a standard entropy
calculation in order to identify a number of different covert
storage channels.
In the future we would like to explore the connections
between other suspicious activity and the use of covert
channels. Additionally, we would like to see if the current
detection system could be adapted to not only detect covert
channels, but also to block and filter them. This type of
system could take advantage of normalization on only
suspect packets thereby making the previous work on
normalization more effective, turning our passive warden
system into an active warden system. Furthermore, we want
to investigate ways to further reduce the false positive rate
while keeping the detection rate stable.
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